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CLARK V. CANTRELL: A WINDFALL FOR NEGLIGENT

PLAINTIFFS OR PRESERVING THE GOALS OF PUNITIVE

DAMAGES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the eighteenth century when punitive damages were first accepted in
South Carolina,' their place in South Carolina law has been well established.2
Following their introduction, the exact role of punitive damages in South Carolina
civil litigation has been the subject of discussion and debate.'
One particularly important part of the debate stemmed from the South Carolina
Supreme Court's adoption of comparative negligence in Nelson v. ConcreteSupply
Co.4 Under the comparative fault scheme, when a plaintiff is found to be negligent,
recovery is reduced according to the plaintiff's degree of fault.5 However, it was not
clear until recently whether a plaintiffs "recovery" encompassed all damages, both
compensatory and punitive, or if only compensatory damages were included. In the
recent case of Clark v. Cantrell' the South Carolina Supreme Court answered this
question, holding that only compensatory damages would be reduced according to
the plaintiffs negligence; any punitive damage award would remain intact.7
This Note discusses Clark and the court's reasons for not disturbing the
punitive damage award despite a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Part II of this Note provides background information on the adoption of
comparative negligence and the underlying goals of punitive damages. Part III
examines the national trend regarding the issue of whether punitive damages are
reduced in a comparative negligence system. Finally, Part IV analyzes the decision
in Clark and examines the problems and issues that the decision raises. This Note
concludes that while the issues involved are complex and the problems are
numerous, the solution provided by the Clark court effectively reconciles the
purpose of punitive damages with the goals of the comparative fault system.

1. Genay v. Norris, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 6, 7 (1784) (requiring defendant who committed a "very
wanton outrage" against plaintiff to pay "exemplary damages").
2. Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567,574,106 S.E.2d258, 261 (1958) ("But we need
dwell no longer upon the rationale, or upon the merits or demerits, of the doctrine [of punitive
damages]. Acquiescence in it for almost two centuries justifies the conclusion that it is now agreeable
to, and part of, the public policy of the state.").
3. See generallyid.at 572-73, 106 S.E.2d at 261 (discussing the debate over punitive damages
and providing a concise history of the doctrine in South Carolina).
4. 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
5. Id. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
6. 339 S.C. 369, 529 S.E.2d 528 (2000).
7. See id. at 381, 529 S.E.2d at 535.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Elimination ofContributoryNegligence andthe Adoption ofComparative
Fault
1. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.
In 1991 the South Carolina Supreme Court changed the course of tort law in
South Carolina with its decision in Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.,8 deciding that
the doctrine of comparative negligence would apply in any action arising on or after
July 1, 1991.' This landmark decision overruled the long-upheld doctrine of
contributory negligence and placed South Carolina in step with the majority of
jurisdictions where comparative negligence had already been adopted.'" South
Carolina's system of comparative fault, after Nelson, allows a plaintiff to "recover
damages if his or her negligence is not greater than that of the defendant.""
A comparative fault system that allows a plaintiff to recover damages as long
as her degree of fault is 50% or less is a mixed or modified system. In this system,
when the negligence of the plaintiff is equal to the negligence of the defendant, the
plaintiff is still able to recover.' 2 A second mixed form of comparative fault allows
the plaintiff to recover only if the negligence of the plaintiff is less than that of the
defendant. In other words, if the plaintiffs degree of fault is equal to the
defendant's degree of fault, she is not allowed to recover. 3 Finally, comparative
fault systems come in a pure form, wherein plaintiffs may recover even if their
negligence is greater than the defendant's negligence. 4
The Nelson court found comparative negligence to be a "more equitable
doctrine" than contributory negligence, which barred any recovery for a plaintiff
who contributed to an accident even slightly. 5 In Nelson South Carolina adopted
the mixed system that allows recovery when the plaintiffs negligence is not greater
than the defendant's negligence. 6 The effect of the mixed comparative fault scheme
is to allow recovery for plaintiffs such as John Clark and Maggie Anderson in the
Clark case, whose degree of fault was less than that of the defendant but who still

8. 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
9. Id. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
10. Id. at 244, 399 S.E.2d at 784; see also F. Patrick Hubbard & Robert L. Felix, Comparative
Negligence in South Carolina:ImplementingNelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 43 S.C. L. REV. 273,278

(1992) (discussing Nelson and the implementation of comparative negligence in South Carolina and
other states).
11. Nelson, 303 S.C. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
12. See Hubbard and Felix, supranote 10, at 277; F. PATRICKHUBBARD &ROBERTL. FELIX, THE
SouTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 174 (2d ed. 1997).

13.
14.
15.
16.

See Hubbard & Felix, supra note 10, at 277-78.
Id. at 278.
Nelson, 303 S.C. at 244, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
Id.
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contributed to their own accident.' 7 Before Nelson these negligent plaintiffs would

have recovered nothing from the defendant.
2.

UnresolvedProblems After Nelson

Under the mixed comparative fault scheme, a negligent plaintiffwill not receive
a full recovery. Nelson mandates a reduction in the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery according to the degree of fault.'8 The mandatory reduction under Nelson
led to the problem facing the court in Clark-whetherthe word "recovery" includes
9
all damages, compensatory and punitive, or just compensatory damages. 1 Many
courts have faced this question and have decided that "recovery" includes only
compensatory damages and that "the plaintiffs comparative negligence will not be
permitted to diminish the [punitive] award."2' The rationale behind these cases, as
well as behind Clark, is that while compensatory damages make the plaintiffwhole
again, and thus constitute recovery, punitive damages are awarded purely to punish
the defendant.2 Thus, when courts decide not to reduce punitive damage awards,
their main considerations are the purpose behind punitive damages and the nature
of the defendant's behavior.22
B.

The Purposes of PunitiveDamages

In order to understand the court's holding in Clark and the reasoning behind

similar holdings in other jurisdictions, the purpose of punitive damages and how
they are awarded in negligence actions should be considered. The primary purpose

of punitive damages in negligence actions is to punish the defendant.23 This punitive
purpose differs significantly from the goal of compensatory or actual damages,

17. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 378, 529 S.E.2d 528, 533 (2000).
18. Nelson, 303 S.C. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784 ("The amount of the plaintiffs recovery shall be
reduced in proportion to the amount of his or her negligence.").
19. Clark, 339 S.C. at 377-78, 529 S.E.2d at 532-33.
20. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27,38 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See
generallyFrancis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Effect ofPlaintiff'sComparativeNegligence inReducing
Punitive Damages Recoverable, 27 A.L.R. 4th 318, 319-21 (1984) (providing an explanation of the
cases holding that actual damages, but not punitive damages, are reduced in comparative negligence).
21. Clark, 339 S.C. at 378, 529 S.E.2d at 533 ("The purposes of punitive damages are to punish
the wrongdoer and deter the wrongdoer and others from engaging in similar reckless, willful, wanton,
or malicious conduct in the future."); see also Dougherty, supra note 20, at 319-21 (providing an
overview of the reasoning in cases holding that punitive damages are not to be reduced).
22. See, e.g., Robbins v. McCarthy, 581 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Ind.Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that
when awarding punitive damages the focus is on the defendant and her behavior). The Robbins court
stated "in making that decision all thoughts of benefitting the injured party should be laid aside and the
sole issues are whether or not the defendant's conduct was so obdurate that he should be punishedfor
the benefit of the generalpublic." Id. (citing Orkin Extermination Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019,
1022 (Ind. 1986)); see also Dougherty, supra note 20, at 319-21 (discussing the reasoning of similar
holdings from other jurisdictions).
23. See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 3 (1988) (discussing the general purposes of
punitive damages and actual damages).
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which are used to make the plaintiffwhole again after a loss.2 4 It is well settled that
"actual damages are recoverable at law from a wrongdoer as compensation for the
actual loss or injuries sustained by reason of a tortfeasor's wrongdoing."25
In South Carolina, punitive damages serve several purposes, including
punishment ofthe wrongdoer.26 South Carolina case law indicates that the rationales
for punitive damages can be separated into three distinct but related categories as
follows: (1) punishment of the defendant and deterrence for both the wrongdoer
and society as a whole,2 7 (2) "vindication of private rights,"2' and (3) additional
compensation for the plaintiff for the aggravated circumstances involved.29
1. Punishmentand Deterrence
Probably the most familiar and perhaps most important aspects of punitive
damages are punishment and deterrence. Punishment is cited most often in South
Carolina cases as the primary goal behind punitive damage awards. 30 In Gamble v.
Stevenson the jury awarded the plaintiff $87,500 in punitive damages as a result of
an accident caused by the plaintiff's failure to stop at an intersection where the stop
sign had been removed by the defendant during road work.3' In supporting the
award of punitive damages the South Carolina Supreme Court explained that
punitive damages are used as 'punishment and as a warning and example to deter
the wrongdoer and others from committing like offenses in the future." 32 Likewise,
in Campus Sweater andSportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn ConstructionCo. the South
Carolina District Court set forth the purposes of punitive damages and, in so doing,

24. Id. ("[C]ompensatory damages are awarded to compensate an injured party for his injury,
while punitive damages are awarded to punish a wrongdoer." (footnotes omitted)).
25. Id. § 24.
26. Gamblev. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 110,406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1991). In Gamble, the court
explained that "[i]n South Carolina, 'punitive damages are allowed in the interest of society in the
nature ofpunishment and as a warning and example to deter the wrongdoer and others from committing
like offenses in the future."'Id. (quoting Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 396, 134 S.E.2d
206, 210 (1964)). In addition, punitive damages "serve 'as a vindication of private rights when it is
proved that such have been wantonly, willfully or maliciously violated."' Id. (quoting Harris v.
Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 196, 199 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1973)).
27. See id.
28. Harris,261 S.C. at 196, 199 S.E.2d at 68; see also Gilbert v. Duke Power Co., 255 S.C. 495,
500, 179 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1971) (explaining that punitive damages also serve to vindicate the private
rights of the injured plaintiff).
29. See, e.g., Campus Sweater and Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64,
105 (D.S.C. 1979) (explaining that punitive damages serve a compensatory function); Rogers v.
Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 573, 106 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1958) (quoting Watts v. South Bound
RR Co., 60 S.C. 67,73,38 S.E. 240,242 (1901) and discussing the presence ofa compensatory aspect
of punitive damages).
30. Several cases cite punishment as one of the most important goals behind punitive damages.
See Gamble, 305 S.C. at 110, 406 S.E.2d at 354; Campus Sweater, 515 F. Supp. at 105 (quoting
Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 142 S.C. 125, 138, 140 S.E. 443, 447 (1927)).
31. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 106,406 S.E.2d at 351.
32. Id. at 110, 406 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388,396, 134
S.E.2d 206,210 (1964)).
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sAessed that "'[o]ne of the chief purposes in awarding damages of this class is to
punish the wrongdoer, not only to prevent by him a recurrence of the wrongful act,
but to deter others from conduct of the same or similar kind."' ' 33 Although
punishment and deterrence are two of the principal concerns behind an award of
punitive damages, they are by no means the only ones.
2.

Vindication

34
Punitive damages are also awarded "as vindication of [a] private right,"
meaning that punitive damages serve as a sort of court-sanctioned revenge for the
plaintiff for the violation of her rights at the hands of the defendant.35 In Campus
Sweater, the South Carolina District Court explained:

It must be noted that deterrence and warnings to others are not the
only purposes which punitive damages serve in South Carolina.
The cases speak in terms of vindicating a private right. In other
words, punitive damages serve as a type of private revenge which
is carried
out in the courts rather than through duels or in back
36
alleys.
Thus, vindication is another reason punitive damages are awarded to the plaintiff
even when the plaintiff has already been made whole through compensatory
damages.31
3. Compensation
Several South Carolina cases have referred to the compensatory aspect of
punitive damages.3" However, the existence of a compensatory purpose does not
mean that punitive damages are used to compensate for the plaintiff's loss. Punitive
damages are compensatory in a different sense: they provide additional recovery
for the plaintiff so the award adequately reflects the nature of the harm inflicted by
the defendant. 39 The subtle difference between the compensatory purpose of
punitive damages and the punishment purpose is the focus of compensation on the

33. Campus Sweater, 515 F. Supp. at 105 (quotingJohnson, 142 S.C. at 138, 140 S.E. at 447).

34. Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 437, 144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (1965) (citing Davenport v.
Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E.2d 740 (1954)).
35. Campus Sweater, 515 F. Supp. at 105.
36. Id (citing Watts v. South Bound R.R. Co., 60 S.C. 67,38 S.E. 240 (1901)).
37. Watts, 60 S.C. at 73, 38 S.E. at 242 ("Exemplary or punitive damages go to the plaintiff, not
as a fine or penalty for a public wrong, but in vindication of a private right which has been willfully
invaded.").
38. See CampusSweater, 515 F. Supp. at 105; Hicks, 246 S.C. at437, 144 S.E.2d at 155; Rogers
v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567,573, 106 S.E.2d 258,261 (1958); Watts, 60 S.C. at 73,38 S.E.
at 242.
39. Watts, 60 S.C. at 73, 38 S.E. at 242 (stating punitive damages "in a measure compensate or
satisfy for the wilfulness with which the private right was invaded."). Id.
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plaintiff and her injury, not just on the defendant's conduct. The compensatory

nature of punitive damages also reflects the view that punitive damages are needed
to compensate the plaintiff for additional costs which may not be included in the
compensatory award. 40 Accordingly, with an award of compensatory and punitive
damages, the jury fully compensates the plaintiff for any costs incurred as a result
of the defendant's conduct, and punishes the defendant while attempting to deter
similar conduct in the future.
C. The Standardfor an Award ofPunitive Damages
The special functions served by punitive damages show that only certain kinds
of behavior can support an award of punitive damages.41 Mere negligence or gross
negligence is not sufficient to support an award of punitive damages; a defendant's
behavior must reflect a reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights. 42 When deciding
whether particular behavior meets the standard for an award of punitive damages,
the question is inevitably a matter of degree. The South Carolina Supreme Court,

inHicks v. McCandlish,43 explained the degrees of negligence in the following way:
The cases make the distinction ... that negligence may be so
gross as to amount to recklessness, and when it does, it ceases to
be mere negligence and assumes very much the nature of
wilfulness. So much so that it has been more than once held in this
state that a charge of reckless misconduct will justify the jury, if
the same be proved, in awarding punitive damages.'

40. CampusSweater, 515 F. Supp. at 105 ("Punitive damages also serve to compensate the victim
for his attorneys' fees, which are normally taken out of his compensatory damage verdict, and for other
expenses for which the jury does not award compensatories.").
41. See id.at 104; see also Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 110,406 S.E.2d 350,354 (1991)
(explaining that punitive damages maybe warranted when the plaintiff's rights have been "'wantonly,
willfully or maliciously violated' (quoting Harris v. Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 196, 199 S.E.2d 65, 68
(1973))); Gilbert v. Duke Power Co., 255 S.C. 495, 500, 179 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1971) (reiterating the
general rule that a plaintiffis entitled to punitive damages if"he proves the wanton, willful or malicious
violation of his rights" (citing Davenport v. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E.2d 740
(1954))); Campus Sweater, 515 F. Supp. at 104 ("South Carolina, as do most other jurisdictions,
requires misconduct above and beyond mere negligence or gross negligence to entitle a plaintiff to
punitive damages.").
42. SeeHarris v. Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 196, 199 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1973); Davenport v. Woodside
Cotton Mills Co., 225 S.C. 52, 60, 80 S.E.2d 740,744 (1954); Beaudrot v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 S.C.
160, 165,48 S.E. 106, 107 (1904); see also HUBBARD & FELIX, supranote 12, at 583 (explaining the
definitions of recklessness under South Carolina case law). Professors Hubbard and Felix note that in
South Carolina "[t]he cases take two views concerning the definition of 'recklessness.' Some cases
indicate that it requires some conscious awareness of negligence of other wrongdoing, and some
indicate that the test is more objective and that recklessness exists ifa reasonable person would regard
the conduct as reckless." HUBBARD &FELIX, supra note 12, at 583.
43. 221 S.C. 410, 70 S.E.2d 629 (1952).
44. Id. at 415, 70 S.E.2d at 631 (citing Proctor v. Southern Ry. Co., 61 S.C. 170, 189, 39 S.E.
351, 358-59 (1901)).
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The distinction is best illustrated through an example, such as the behavior of
the plaintiffand the defendant in Clark.Anderson, one of the plaintiffs, was deemed
negligent when she turned left in front of the defendant's car.45 Anderson's behavior
was merely negligent because, while perhaps she was not as careful as she should
have been, this kind of behavior is fairly common and is not deserving of
punishment. 46 The defendant's behavior, on the other hand, was reckless and
deserving of punitive damages because she was speeding and driving in a dangerous
manner.47 The defendant's behavior exhibited a reckless disregard for the rights of
other drivers on the road, and her behavior created a real risk for others; thus, her
behavior deserved punishment. The distinction between ordinarily negligent
behavior and reckless behavior, as well as the purposes of punitive damages,
discussed in this Note, are important in light of the supreme court's reasoning in
Clark and the holdings in similar cases from other jurisdictions.
III.

APPROACHES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The court's reasoning in Clark comports with that of the majority of
jurisdictions around the country.48 These courts have also looked at the purposes of
punitive damages in their respective states and have decided that the best way to
preserve the utility ofpunitive damage awards in negligence actions is to leave the
award intact, despite a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff.49 The
reasoning adopted by these courts is analogous to the reasoning in Clark in part
because the reasons for punitive damages and the standard for imposing them are
substantially the same across the country.5"
For example, in the Iowa case of Godbersen v. Miller,5 1 plaintiff Dale
Godbersen was awarded three thousand dollars in compensatory damages and
twelve thousand dollars in punitive damages despite being found fifty percent at
fault in the incident.52 The action arose out of a bar fight that spilled out into the
street. 3 The defendant, Donnie Miller, eventually got into his vehicle and drove

45. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 376, 529 S.E.2d 528, 532 (2000).
46. Id. at 381, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
47. Id. at 376, 381, 529 S.E.2d at 532, 534.
48. See Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1272-73 (W.D. Okla. 1980);
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27,38 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Davis v. Lira,
817 P.2d 539, 542 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 832 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1992);
Godbersen v. Miller, 439 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Iowa 1989); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 122-23
(Kan. 1984); Wolf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 808 S.W.2d 868, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991);
Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 653, 658-59 (Mont. 1981); Blazovic v.
Andrich, 590 A.2d 222,231-32 (N.J. 1991); Comeau v. Lucas, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871,873 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); Summit Fasteners, Inc. v. Harleysville Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 599 A.2d 203,206 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991); Hondo's Truck Stop Cafe, Inc. v. Clemmons, 716 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. App. 1986);
Tucker v. Marcus, 418 N.W.2d 818, 828-29 (Wis. 1988).
49. See supra note 48.
50. See supra note 48.
51. 439 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1989).
52. Id. at 208.
53. Id. at 207.
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toward Godbersen.54 During the incident Godberson was trapped between Miller's
car and another car, sustaining minor injuries. 5 When the police were called to the
scene, Miller's blood-alcohol level was 0.165.56 Affirming the trial court's refusal
to reduce the punitive damage award, the Iowa Supreme Court discussed the
distinction between actual damages and punitive damages in the comparative fault
system.57 According to the court, a reduction in compensatory damages "represents
a way of making the plaintiff 'pay' for his or her proportional responsibility" and
"prevents a plaintiff from being compensated for fault that he or she should fairly
bear."5" Punitive damages, on the other hand, are imposed on the defendant as a
penalty "for conduct that is grossly negligent, wanton, willful or reckless."5 9 The
Iowa Supreme Court also shared the Clark court's concern that reducing the
punitive award would punish the plaintiff for conduct that did not meet the standard
for punitive damages.6"
Likewise, in Bowman v. Doherty,61 the Kansas Supreme Court affirned the trial
court's decision not to reduce a punitive damage award.62 In this action for legal
malpractice, the plaintiffwas attributed thirtypercent of the fault, the defendant fifty
percent, and a third party twentypercent of the fault.63 Judgment was entered for the
plaintiff in the amount of one-hundred dollars in actual damages and nine-hundred
dollars in punitive damages.' The Kansas Supreme Court held that the punitive
damage award should not be reduced, stating that "[p]unitive damages are allowed
in Kansas, not because of any special merit of the injured party's case, but are
imposed to punish the wrongdoer for malicious, vindictive or willful and wanton
invasion of the injured party's rights. '65 Again, great consideration was given to the
primary purpose of punitive damages-to punish and deter like66behavior-and to
the different functions of compensatory and punitive damages.
In Robbins v. McCarthy67 the Indiana Court of Appeals also discussed the
policy reasons for an award of punitive damages.68 The court concluded that
"[p]unitive damages are not compensatory in nature but designed to punish the
wrongdoer and dissuade him and others similarly situated from such conduct in the

54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Godbersen,439 N.W.2d at 208-09.
58. Id. at 208.
59. Id. (citing Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406,410-11 (Iowa 1984)). The Godbersen
court also noted "[p]unishment, not compensation, is the goal.... The object is deterrence, not
proportional recovery." Id. (citation omitted).
60. Id. ("It would penalize [the plaintiff] for conduct over which he had no control while letting
[the defendant's] outrageous conduct go unpunished.").
61. 686 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984).
62. Id. at 122.
63. Id. at 117.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 121.
66. Id. at 122.
67. 581 N.E.2d 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
68. Id. at 932.
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future." Thus, the Indiana court shared the Clark court's fear that any reduction
in a punitive damage award would weaken the punishment and deterrent effects of
the award. The Robbins case also reflects the view that the jury should look only at
the defendant's behavior when awarding punitive damages.7" The court explains:
When the question of whether punitive damages should be given
is considered, it must be done with the realization that the plaintiff
has already been awarded all that he is entitled to receive as a
matter of law. What, if anything, he may be given in addition is a
windfall, and in making that decision all thoughts of benefitting
the injured party should be laid aside and the sole issues are
whether or not the defendant's conduct was so obdurate that he
should be punished for the benefit of the general public.71
A federal district court in Oklahoma also discussed punitive damages as a
means of benefitting and protecting society as a whole in Amoco Pipeline Co. v.
Montgomery.72 Punitive damages are "punishment imposed for the benefit of
society, as a restraint upon the transgressor and as a warning and example to deter
him and others from committing similar offenses in the future. 73 The plaintiff's
degree of fault should not even be a factor in an award of punitive damages because
the defendant is being punished for the good of society, not just for the harm done
to the plaintiff.
Similarly, in the New Jersey case of Blazovic v. Andrich,74 the court held that
because punitive damages are designed to punish the defendant, a punitive award
must not be reduced according to the plaintiff s degree of fault, while compensatory
damages should reflect the plaintiff s negligence.75 This system, according to the
New Jersey Court, "accomplish[es] the goal of equitably dividing liability for a
plaintiffs compensatory damages,
while keeping intact the policy of punishing
76
wanton or intentional acts.
Finally, a Wisconsin case, Tucker v. Marcus,77 also addresses the punishment
and deterrent effects ofpunitive damages and highlights the distinct considerations
involved in such an award.7" In Wisconsin, "[p]unitive damages are properly
denominated 'smart money' and are designed to hurt in order to punish and to
deter."79 The Tucker court explained that "[p]unishment and deterrence are purposes

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind. 1986)).
Id.
Id (quoting Orkin ExterminatingCo., 486 N.E.2d at 1022).
487 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (W.D. Okla. 1980).

73. Id. (citing Main v. Levine, 118 P.2d 252, 255 (OkIa. 1941)).

74. 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991).
75. Id. at 232.

76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. 418 N.W.2d 818 (Wis. 1988).
78. Id. at 822.

79. Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (Wis. 1980) (quoting Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv.
Cas. Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Wis. 1978)).
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fundamentally distinct from 'the basic goal of the law of negligence, the equitable
distribution
of the loss in relation to the respective contribution of the faults causing
80
it.,,'
The differing treatment of compensatory and punitive damages is clearly due,
in part, to their distinct purposes. The reasoning involved in the cases discussed
above is very similar to the South Carolina Supreme Court's reasoning in Clark v.
Cantrell. These decisions all share a focus on the importance of the goals and
purposes of punitive damages as well as a desire to further those goals.
IV. CLARX V. CANTRELL
1 arose out of an automobile accident in which
Clark v. Cantrell"
the vehicle of
the defendant, Cantrell, collided with the vehicle owned by the plaintiff, Clark, and
driven by Maggie Lee Anderson. 2 The accident occurred when Cantrell's speeding
vehicle hit Anderson as she was turning left across two lanes of traffic. 3 The impact
forced David James from the plaintiff's car, causing his death. 4 The jury
apportioned sixteen percent of the fault to Anderson and eighty-four percent of the
blame to Cantrell. 5 The jury awarded Clark $3,000 actual damages and $750
punitive damages, and Anderson received $75,000 in actual damages and $25,000
in punitive damages.86 The compensatory award was reduced according to
Anderson's degree of fault, but the trial judge refused to reduce the punitive
award.87 The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision
not to reduce the punitive damage award in proportion to the plaintiff's fault. 8

A. Goals ofPunitiveDamagesand the Reasons Behind the Decision
The South Carolina Supreme Court in its affimation of Clark was heavily
influenced by its perception of the purposes of punitive damages and the standard
of behavior necessary for such an award. The supreme court acknowledged the
three most important goals behind an award of punitive damages as follows: (1)
punishment of reckless, dangerous behavior; (2) deterrence of this kind of conduct
by the defendant or society as a whole; and (3) compensation for the reckless
manner with which the defendant violated the plaintiff s rights.89
After a careful analysis of the multiple goals of punitive damage awards, the
supreme court cited four reasons for its affirmation of the court of appeals' decision

80. Tucker, 418 N.W.2d at 822 (quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (Wis. 1962)).
81. 339 S.C. 369, 529 S.E.2d 528 (2000).

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 376, 529 S.E.2d at 532.
Id. at 376-77, 529 S.E.2d at 532.
Id. at 376, 529 S.E.2d at 532.
Id. at 377, 529 S.E.2d at 532.

86. Id.

87. Clark, 339 S.C. at 377, 529 S.E.2d at 532.
88. Id. at 375, 529 S.E.2d at 531.
89. Id. at 379, 529 S.E.2d at 533.
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not to reduce punitive damages. 9° These reasons are directly related to the purpose
of punitive damages. First, the court reasoned that reducing the punitive damage
award would lessen the award's impact on the defendant and thus would "reduce
the punishment and deterrent effect of the award."9' The court believed any
reduction would undermine the utility of a punitive damage award and would
interfere with the punishment and deterrence goals behind the award.92 Second, the
court found that reducing the amount of punitive damages would be tantamount to
punishing the plaintiff for conduct that was merely negligent.93 The comparative
fault system does not punish ordinarily negligent behavior through an award of
punitive damages; only willful or wanton conduct warrants this kind of award. 94
Third, the court found it inappropriate to compare the plaintiffs ordinary negligent
behavior with the defendant's willful conduct for the purpose of reducing the
plaintiffs punitive damage award.95 Finally, the court also concluded it was
inappropriate to consider the plaintiffs behavior at all when considering an award
of punitive damages.96 The sole focus instead should be on the defendant's
conduct.97 In other words, the comparison of the plaintiffs and defendant's
behavior ends when the jury decides that punitive damages are appropriate;
attention then shifts to the defendant.
B. A Closer Look: The Reasons Not to Reduce
1. Punishment and Deterrence
The first argument made by the court in Clark emphasizes the punishment and
deterrence aspects of punitive damages. The court argues that a reduction in the
punitive damage award would correspondingly "reduce the punishment and
deterrent effect of the award." 98 This seems to be the most common justification for
the refusal to reduce punitive damages and is universally cited by courts addressing

90. Id. at 379-81, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
91. Id. at 379-80, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
92. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Clark,339 S.C. at 380, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
Id.
Id. at 381, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 379-80, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
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this issue.99 Deterrence is an important aspect as punitive damages deter reckless
behavior by making it costly for people to conduct themselves in such a manner.' 0
It is important to remember, however, that deterrence is an important aspect of
the tort system as a whole. Making the plaintiff whole through an award of
compensatory damages is also a way to deter negligent behavior by the defendant.
The negligent defendant is forced to pay for the plaintiffs loss, not only to
compensate the plaintiff and to place the financial burden on the person at fault, but
also to deter careless behavior in the future. Thus, in most instances, ordinarily
negligent behavior is deterred as well. So although negligent behavior is not to be
punished through an award of punitive damages, deterrence of this behavior does
contribute to a more cautious and prudent society. If a negligent defendant were
able to avoid compensating the plaintiff, negligent behavior would be encouraged,
assuming that the defendant would only consider his net gain or loss resulting from
the act. Accordingly, allowing a negligent plaintiff to receive a full punitive award
0
may compromise the deterrence of the plaintiff s ordinarily negligent behavior.' '
Consider the problems this could pose under a pure comparative fault system. In a
pure comparative fault system, the plaintiff can recover damages regardless of her
degree of fault. 02 Thus, a plaintiff could be more negligent than the defendant and
still recover. Ifpunitive damages are not reduced, the negligent plaintiff could also
receive a full punitive award in addition to compensatory damages, despite having
been more negligent than the defendant. 3
In addition, punitive damages are not awarded solely as a means ofpunishment.
If punishment were the only reason, then punitive damages would not necessarily
be awarded to the plaintiff, who has already been made whole through
compensatory damages. Unless some other objective exists for a punitive award,
there is no reason to give the award to the plaintiff. The award could instead be

99. See, e.g., Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (W.D. Okla. 1980)
("Punitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer. . . .'); Robbins v. McCarthy, 581 N.E.2d
929, 932 (Ind.Ct. App. 1991) ("Punitive damages are not compensatory in nature but designed to
punish the wrongdoer." (citing Orkin Extermination Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind.
1986))); Godbersen v. Miller, 439 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Iowa 1989) ("[P]unitive damages are designed
to exact a penalty from the defendant for conduct that is grossly negligent, wanton, willful, or reckless."
(citation omitted)); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 122 (Kan. 1984) ("An award of punitive
damages is to punish the wrongdoer, not to compensate for the wrong."); Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d
222, 232 (N.J. 1991) ("[Plunitive damages are designed to punish the wrongdoer."); Fahrenberg v.
Tengel, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (Wis. 1980) ("Punitive damages are properly denominated 'smart
money' and are designed to hurt in order to punish and deter." (quoting Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas.
Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Wis. 1978))).
100. See Fahrenberg,291 N.W.2d at 527 (Wis. 1980) ("Punitive damages are properly
denominated 'smart money' and are designed to hurt in order to punish and to deter." (quoting
Cieslewicz, 267 N.W.2d at 601 (Wis. 1978))).
101. See generallyVictor E. Schwartz, ComparativeFaultandPunitiveDamages-Balancing
the Equities: They Must Intersect,23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 125, 131-32 (1992) (explaining that
both parties "have engaged in conduct that should be discouraged by our society").
102. See Hubbard & Felix, supra note 10, at 278.
103. See Schwartz, supra note 101, at 131-32.
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given to a fund or a suitable charity.' The defendant would still have to pay, and
thus the deterrent function of punitive damages would be realized; however, the
plaintiff would get no more than what is needed to compensate for the loss. 0 5 This
seems unfair to the plaintiff, precisely because punitive damages do serve other
purposes. Punitive damages are also awarded to "vindicate a private right" and to
compensate for both the reckless manner in which the plaintiffs rights were
invaded and for certain costs that are not included in the compensatory award." 6
The plaintiff deserves to get the money because the defendant has violated the
plaintiff's rights in a manner that warrants punishment. Punitive damages are a way
of both recognizing the way in which the plaintiff has been harmed and accounting
for the more severe harm that may result from such reckless behavior. This idea is
reflected in South Carolina cases such as Watts v. South Bound Railroad
Company,"°7 where the South Carolina Supreme Court explained that punitive
"damages in a measure compensate or satisfy for the wilfulness with which the
private right was invaded.... ." ' These purposes, while perhaps not discussed as
often as the punishment aspect, are nevertheless integral to an award of punitive
damages.
Despite compelling counter viewpoints, deterrence is still a strong argument
against reduction of punitive damages. Deterrence of reckless and willful behavior
is a top priority in tort law."° If this sort of behavior goes unpunished, defendants
may deem risky behavior cost effective because of a relatively minor damage award
to the plaintiff. Reckless behavior of this sort cannot be encouraged and must be
deterred even if a negligent plaintiff is awarded a large sum in punitive damages.
By punishing the defendant with punitive damages, regardless of the negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, deterrence is achieved where it is needed the most.

104. See IND. CODEANN. § 34-51-3-6 (Michie 1998). Indiana's statute provides for payment of
a punitive damage award to the clerk of court, who then pays 25% to the party awarded the damages

and 75% to the state treasurer who deposits the funds into the violent crime victims compensation fund.
Id.
105. As in the Indiana statute above, a defendant still has to pay the award, but the plaintiff only
receives twenty-five percent of the award, little more than what is needed to fully compensate for the

loss. Id.
106. See Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104,110,406 S.E.2d350, 354 (1991); see also Campus
Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 105 (D.S.C. 1979); Harris v.
Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 196, 199 S.E.2d 65,68 (1973); Davenportv. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 225
S.C. 52, 60, 80 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1954).
107. 60 S.C. 67, 38 S.E. 240 (1901).
108. Id. at 73, 38 S.E. at 242.
109. See generallyCampusSweater, 515 F. Supp. at 105 (quoting Johnson v. Atlantic Coastline
R.R. Co., 142 S.C. 125, 138, 140 S.E. 443, 447 (1927)) ("'One of the chief purposes in awarding
damages of this class is to punish the wrongdoer, not only to prevent by him a recurrence of the
wrongful act, but to deter others from conduct ofthe same or similar kind."'); Gamble, 305 S.C. at 110,
406 S.E.2d at 354 (noting the deterrent function of punitive damages in South Carolina).
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2. Reduction as Punishmentfor the Plaintiff
The second reason the South Carolina Supreme Court cites for not reducing
punitive damages is the belief that "any reduction in the defendant's punishment
inflicts a corresponding amount of punishment on the plaintiff."".. On the other
hand, a refusal to reduce an award of punitive damages might also be seen as
punishing the defendant beyond his degree of fault. One might say the reduction of
a punitive award is notpunishment for the plaintiff, but rather a means to punish the
defendant in proportion to his fault. Otherwise, the negligent plaintiff receives a
windfall and the reckless defendant must pay the entire punitive award. This
viewpoint is problematic because such reduction still allows simple negligence to
offset more serious, reckless behavior, regardless of whether reduction of punitive
damages is considered to be punishment to the plaintiff. The negligent plaintiff did
contribute to the accident, so it is appropriate to allocate the cost of the accident to
both parties according to their degree of fault. Thus, the compensatory damages are
reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's degree of fault.
However, punitive damages are different. A punitive damage award does not
have to bear a certain relation to the cost of the accident."' It is more important for
a punitive award to bear a relation to the degree of behavior being punished." 2
There is a "need to individualize punitive damage verdicts. One must look to
behavior, not to results, to determine the need to admonish[ ....
],,'Since the
punitive award focuses on the defendant's behavior, the plaintiff s mere negligence
should not be used to offset the defendant's reckless behavior. In Clark the plaintiff
contributed to the accident, but did not contribute to the defendant's punishable
behavior." 4 The court in Godbersen explained that a reduction of the punitive
damage award "would penalize [the plaintiff] for conduct over which he had no
control while letting [the defendant's] outrageous conduct go unpunished.""' 5 The
plaintiff's contribution to the accident should not be used to reduce punishment
imposed on the defendant when the plaintiff shared no responsibility for the
defendant's behavior.

110. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 380, 529 S.E.2d 528, 534 (2000).
111. See Campus Sweater, 515 F. Supp. at 106 ("The admonitory function ofpunitive damages
does not lend itself to formulation. For one thing, a survey of South Carolina cases indicates that there
has never been an agreement on ratios. There is no definite mathematical rule as to the proportion which
punitive damages should bear to actual damages." (citing Eaddy v. Greensboro-Fayetteville Bus Lines,
191 S.C. 538, 5 S.E.2d 281,283 (1939))); Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 436, 144 S.E.2d 151, 154
(1965) ("No formula for the measurement ofpunitive damages... is possible, and the amount to be
awarded is peculiarly within the judgment and discretion of the jury ....
).
112. See generally Campus Sweater, 515 F. Supp. at 106 (explaining that behavior is more
important that actual damages in determining a punitive award).
113. Id.
114. Clark, 339 S.C. at 380, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
115. Godbersen v. Miller, 439 N.W.2d 206,208 (Iowa 1989).
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3.

InappropriateComparison

The third reason for the court's decision not to reduce punitive damages also
involves the distinction between the plaintiff's behavior, mere negligence, and the
defendant's willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. 16 The court stated that it would
be "inappropriate to reduce the punitive damages by comparing the plaintiffs
'
negligence with the defendant's reckless or willful conduct."117
In other words,
when considering punitive damages, mere negligence and reckless conduct should
not be compared as they are when considering compensatory damages.
One might ask why the comparison must stop at punitive damages when the
purpose of comparative fault is to compare the conduct of the plaintiff and
defendant."' At first glance, this seems to be a valid question. Comparative fault
was created so behaviors could be compared, thus creating a flexible system where
the results are not quite as severe as a contributory negligence system." 9 With the
comparative fault system, courts "no longer have to render decisions in which all
the chips fall on one side or the other. They can compare and contrast."' 20 However,
comparing negligence to recklessness for the purpose of reducing punitive damages
neglects the basic fact that the type of behavior necessary for an award of punitive
damages is fundamentally different from ordinary negligence. Certainly negligence
and more egregious conduct are compared for an award of compensatory damages,
but this is because plaintiffs should share the responsibility for losses that they
helped to create. Although punitive damages are awarded to plaintiffs to help
compensate them fully for their loss, punitive damages are awarded on the basis of
the defendant's punishable behavior, not according to the magnitude of the
plaintiff's loss. 2 In assessing the punitive damages, the plaintiff presumably has
not contributed to the defendant's behavior, so the mere negligence of the plaintiff
should not serve to reduce the defendant's punishment. Again, compensatory
damages focus
on the accident, while punitive damages focus on the defendant's
22
behavior.
In addition, it is important to return to the primarypurpose ofpunitive damages,
which is to punish and deter reckless conduct. The defendant's reckless conduct is
deemed punishable, in part, because it does not merely affect the plaintiff in a given
lawsuit. The reckless behavior can potentially harm anyone in society; therefore,

116. Clark,339 S.C. at 381, 529 S.E.2d at 534.
117. Id.
118. Schwartz, supra note 101, at 129-30.
119. See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 244, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991)
("Having determined comparative negligence is the more equitable doctrine, we now join the vast
majority of our sister jurisdictions and adopt it as the law of South Carolina.").
120. Schwartz, supra note 101, at 129.
121. See Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 121 (Kan. 1984); see also Hubbard & Felix, supra
note 10, at 314.
122. Hubbard & Felix, supra note 10, at 314.
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society has a significant interest in deterring this behavior.'2 3 The defendant is
punished for her potential harm to society as well as for the reckless way in which
she harmed the plaintiff.124 This broader interest is why punishment and deterrence
are of such profound importance when considering an award of punitive damages.
4. Focus on the Defendant
Finally, the Clarkcourt reasoned that punitive damages should not be reduced
because "the focus is on only the defendant."' 25 As previously discussed, it is
difficult to look solely at the defendant when awarding punitive damages because
the award eventually goes to the plaintiff. 2 6 Indeed, the award does go to the
plaintiff because punitive damages serve other functions. Despite the inevitable
presence of the plaintiff in an award ofpunitive damages, the main focus should be
on the defendant's behavior. The defendant's reckless behavior is more costly than
the plaintiffs negligence and is therefore punishable. Even if the plaintiffs
behavior is considered, the result should be the same. The plaintiffs negligence
does not render the defendant's conduct any less deserving of punishment; thus,
such negligence should also not serve to reduce the punitive damage award.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Clarkv. Cantrellmay
at first blush appear to result in a windfall to negligent plaintiffs, it is really the best
way to preserve and uphold the goals of punitive damages, particularly those of
punishment and deterrence. Deterrence applies to ordinary negligence as well, but
society's interest is best served through a more vehement attempt to deter willful
misbehavior. Deterrence of dangerous behavior is of such great importance that the
court sacrifices partial deterrence of ordinary negligence. The reduction of
compensatory damages in accordance with the plaintiff s fault must be enforced to
deter simple negligence. Thus, negligent plaintiffs must still shoulder some of the
responsibility for their loss, though the punitive damages remain unaffected.
Virginia GarnerShelley

123. See generally Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 110, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1991)
("'[P]unitive damages are allowed in the interest of society.
) (quoting Laird v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 243 S.C. 388, 396, 134 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1964)).
124. See id.
125. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 381, 529 S.E.2d 528, 534 (2000).
126. See generallyCampus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp.
64, 105 (D.S.C. 1979) (discussing the reasons an award is given to the plaintiff).
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